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Historians, sociologists and political scientists have shown a 
great interest in tribalism, ethnicity and religious identities in 
the Middle East for many years, and have attempted to study 
their influence on the stability of the states in the region.2 The 
resilience of tribes towards the traumatic events of the twenti-
eth century highlights their capacity to adapt to changing con-
ditions on the ground, such as the shock of colonialism, which 
created new political borders in the Middle East, thus hindering 
tribal movement and migration, and the shock of Arab national-
ism, which considered the tribe as a backward part of society 
that needed to be modernized and incorporated into modern 
society.3  
Arab tribes in Syria have always maintained their culture, soli-
darity, local leadership and considerable control over their in-
ternal affairs. However, since the 1950s, new challenges have 
emerged that threaten tribal structure and the tribe’s traditional 
way of life. Two distinct periods of Syria’s contemporary polit-
ical history may highlight the relationship between the state 
and the tribes: the period before and the period after Hafez al-
Assad’s seizure of power in 1970. The character of this rela-
tionship ranged from the state’s confrontation with the tribes to 
incorporation. 
 
2    Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising 
 
More recently, the Arab Spring was accompanied by the emer-
gence of a variety of new phenomena. Most studies have fo-
cused on the re-emergence of Islamism and democracy and 
their by-products.4 This article attempts to explain the re-
emergence of tribalism. There is a common perception that 
Syria's population is now predominantly urban, and that tribal-
ism is dwindling further because of the settlement of the Bed-
ouin in urban areas. In fact, Aneza and Shammar are large tribal 
confederations that still maintain close tribal connections with 
their relatives in the Arabian Peninsula.5 
Following the events of September 11 in 2001, and after the 
American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it became 
clear to the US that tribal affiliations and modes of social order 
were there all along, and have now re-emerged as a way of or-
ganising people in the absence of the state. More books, articles 
and research papers were published to analyse the tribes in 
those two countries, but hardly any research has been done 
about the tribes of Syria.6 The weak presence of the tribal ques-
tion in the academic and the political discourse about Syria 
does not measure up to the importance of this issue. This study 
aims to identify briefly the mechanisms governing the relation-
ship between the state and the tribe in Syria, numerous aspects 
of which have remained unclear or even unknown to academics 
and outside scholars. In its largest part, it seeks to examine the 
political dimensions of the tribal phenomenon in modern Syria 
following the uprising that erupted in March 2011.  
The methodology involves a review of some of the literature on 
the relationship between tribe and state in general and in Syria 
specifically in addition to some informal interviews with a few 
informants. Contact with the community concerned in this re-
search, has started since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 
March 2011 due to my presence in Syria at that time. 
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Tribes and the state 
Scholars seem to have come to no consensus on the precise 
definition of a tribe. Because the term has been used to describe 
different kinds of groups, it is virtually impossible to produce a 
single clear definition covering all these social formations.7 
‘Tribe’ may be used loosely to describe a localised group in 
which kinship is the dominant idiom of organisation, and 
whose members consider themselves culturally distinct in 
terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins.8 There is 
substantial literature about the relationship between the state 
and the tribe by the 13th century North African sociologist Ibn 
Khaldun. In his Muqaddimah, the Khaldunian cycle remains a 
valuable theory for understanding the socio-economic and po-
litical consequences of the historical interactions between tribal 
culture and urban civilisation in the Middle East.9 According to 
Ibn Khaldoun’s cyclical theory, as long as the state is strong, 
the tribes submit by adapting themselves to their economic and 
political environment. Once the state becomes weak, it be-
comes vulnerable to revolution by those tribal people it tried to 
dominate.10  
Evans-Pritchard uses segmentary lineage theory to describe 
tribal dynamics. The broad idea of this theory is that solidarity 
plays a major role in forming social groups, which combine or 
conflict in predictable ways within a cultural system to main-
tain a general balance of power.11  Gellner expanded on Evans-
Pritchard’s approach by identifying key characteristics of the 
tribes, especially where the tribes interact with the state. One of 
these characteristics is the mercenary option, which would al-
low for shifts in external allegiance or alliance in order to en-
sure the survival of the group.12 The state itself depends on 
tribal systems for authority and, in return, the tribal system of 
authority is maintained and preserved in a dialogic way.13 
Therefore, patronage is one of the most basic forms of social 
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relationship, and it typically manifests when kinship alone is 
unable to guarantee subsistence and physical security.   
 
Tribes and State formation in Syria 
The tribes in Syria have participated in and been affected by 
local and global forces and have also contributed to change, 
historically and at present. It should be noted that in the early 
days of the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916, their 
forces were largely made up of Bedouin and other nomadic de-
sert tribes.14 Khalaf argues that during the French mandate in 
Syria, the colonial forces promoted tribalism as a counterbal-
ance to the rising urban sentiments of nationalism.15 The Bed-
ouin tribes were separated out and encouraged to set up their 
own state in the Badia (the Syrian Steppe) supervised by a 
French military unit.16 Khoury argues that the wedge driven by 
the French and the settled regions ultimately worked to the det-
riment of the tribes in the era of the Syrian independence.17 
When the nationalists came to power after independence, they 
tried to embark upon a policy which aimed at abolishing all 
privileges enjoyed by the tribes. The constitution of 1950 in-
cluded this item “In the electoral law process, special provi-
sions shall be included to meet the special circumstances of the 
Bedouin and make it possible for them to elect their representa-
tives in the parliament.18 This item of the constitution was used 
to reduce tribal representation in the Parliament. The nine seats 
which had been granted to the Bedouin tribes during the French 
Mandate were now reduced to six.19 Moreover, to bring its co-
ercive power to bear in the outlaying tribal areas, the nationalist 
authorities posted gendarmerie with the aim of imposing law 
order and preventing influx of arms to the Bedouin tribes.20  
Later on, the government became more effective and its eco-
nomic and military power increased. The Bedouin were sub-
jected to various forms of interference by the government. 
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Nasserite and Ba’thist Party ideology in Syria required that 
tribes be excluded from the political field and denied access to 
power in an effort to break their strength and redirect their loy-
alty towards the state.21 The tribes were more politically isolat-
ed under the radicalised government of the Ba’th Party when 
arriving to power in 1963. Tribal leaders lost much of their 
prestige as many of their functions were gradually assumed by 
state agencies. Security, livelihood, conflict resolution, range-
land management have all become the state responsibility. 
Thus, the abolishment of (hima) (traditional grazing system)22 
and the suppression of customary law (urf)23 in addition land 
reforms have all contributed to the undermining of tribal inde-
pendence and the increased integration of these groups into the 
nation-state. 
In 1970, Hafez al-Assad set out to broaden the support base for 
his new regime.24 Although tribalism was considered by gov-
ernment and party officials as one of the major ills of pre-
Ba’thist Syria, Hafez al-Assad showed an unusual degree of 
flexibility in his policies towards the tribes. He chose a strate-
gy, in authoritarian fashion, based on creating a system of cli-
entelism between his regime and influential tribal sheikhs. His 
strategy was to co-opt tribal leaders and employ them as tools 
for indirect rule through the use of official appointments and 
subsidies.   
Hafez al-Assad faced growing opposition from the Muslim 
Brotherhood in major urban centres. The Syrian regime needed 
to counterweight the traditional urban-based power groups by 
fostering and maintaining support base among the rural popula-
tions including the Bedouin tribes in the Syrian Badia which 
constitutes 55% of the total area of Syria. Hafez al-Assad used 
his patronage network with the tribes and unleashed their pow-
er to check the Islamists.25 Despite its national slogans of “no 
sectarianism” and “no tribalism”, the Syrian regime did not 
hesitate to seek the aid of the tribes to suppress the uprising in 
1982 in Hama, the stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood.26 
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The regime called upon the assistance of some tribes, particu-
larly Hadidiyn, in the countryside of Hama to check the flow of 
guns from Iraq to Hama and to prevent the desert from being 
refuge for the Muslim Brotherhood members.27 Moreover, 
Hafez al-Assad used the tribes to counter balance the Kurdish 
population in the north-east part of the country. In 1973, Hafez 
al-Assad’s regime started implementing a project that was 
planned in 1962 during the union with Egypt called the “Arab 
Belt” project.28 Thousands of people mainly from Busha’ban 
tribe, who lost their villages in al-Raqqa Governorate due to the 
construction of Euphrates dame, have been encouraged to settle 
in villages built over Kurdish fertile lands in order to challenge 
the status quo of the region, which have traditionally had a 
Kurdish majority. Tribes were seen very loyal to Hafez al-
Assad especially in his battle against the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Therefore, after 1982, tribal representation in the Syrian Par-
liament doubled from 7% to 10%.29 Bedouins began to emerge 
as important members in the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry 
of agriculture and certain branches of the security apparatus.30 
The policies towards the tribes undertaken by Bashar al-Assad 
between 2000 and 2010 were not different much from the poli-
cies carried out during his father’s rule. Bashar has taken the 
government’s relationship with the tribes a step further by 
promoting more Bedouins to prominence within the regime and 
condoning claims by some Ba’ath party members to tribal links 
or origins.31 Moreover, and in a similar way to Hama uprising 
in 1982, Bashar al-Assad used his network of clients from the 
Bedouin tribes, who had been encouraged to settle down in the 
Kurdish areas, to suppress the Kurdish uprising in 2003. How-
ever, the wider popular base of the Syrian society, to which the 
Bedouin in al-Badia and the farmers in the countryside belong, 
have been marginalized and impoverished. The overconcentra-
tion of power and patronage in the ruling clan debilitated the 
clientelist networks that connected the regime to society.32 In 
2003/2004, 5.1 million people were living under the poverty 
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line with 2 million Syrians unable to meet their basic needs.33 
This sparked the Syrian uprising in the predominantly tribal 
Dar’a. From its beginning the uprising featured a rather unusual 
degree of mobilization in the countryside against the regime.34 
 
Tribes and collective action in the Syrian uprising 
The central element in tribal formation is the establishment of 
kinship groups. Each member of the group is responsible for 
each and every other member and the group’s “acts” are called 
“collective action”.35 When attacked, group members are 
obliged to unite to defend themselves; when members sustain 
injury or loss, group members unite to gain compensation or 
seek vengeance. When applying these dynamics to Dar’a, 
which is a predominantly tribal area, where the uprising started, 
I would argue that the Syrian uprising started as collective be-
haviour in its first phase and, as a result of the repressive tactics 
of the regime, it took the form of “collective violence”.  
Smelser's theory of collective behaviour incorporates a general 
conceptual analysis of social change.36 It is principally con-
cerned with showing how various kinds of structural strain 
produce "collective behaviour," which is defined as "mobiliza-
tion on the basis of a belief which redefines social action".37 
Smelser identifies six sets of social determinants whose various 
degrees produce different kinds of collective behaviours:  
First, structural conduciveness refers to structural characteris-
tics that permit or encourage collective behaviour. Tribal bonds 
between the families of Dar'a have been very important in or-
ganising the first protests. Second, structural strain perfectly 
describes the humiliation that the tribal delegation of Dar’a re-
ceived from Atef Najeeb, the head of the political security 
branch in Dar’a. The delegation asked Najeeb to release the 
children imprisoned for writing anti-regime slogans on the wall 
of their school. In a traditional gesture, they took their head-
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bands off and placed them on the table, saying they would take 
them up again when the matter had been resolved.38 The head-
band is the symbol of manhood and chivalry in tribal traditions. 
Therefore, when making a request, tribesmen would tradition-
ally take off their headband expecting the other person to reply 
positively. By way of response Atef took the headbands of the 
senior tribal leaders from the table and threw them into the 
rubbish bin. In response to this disrespectful behaviour, the first 
demonstration to take place in Dar’a was organised by net-
works of tribesmen from al-Zu’bi and al-Masalmeh tribes. 
Therefore, “Friday of the Tribes” is held in recognition of Syri-
an tribes participating in protests against the Syrian regime.  
Third, growth and spread of generalized belief: the develop-
ment of mass communication technology enabled the rest of 
the Syrian tribes to see their fellow tribesmen in Dar’a being 
shot at and killed in the streets, which made the spark of the 
revolution move quickly to other regions in Syria. The word 
fiz’a which means the taking up of arms in defense of a mar-
tyred relative or honoured individual has been used a lot in 
Dar’a early protests and is believed to be a motivator for pro-
testers from other tribes in Homs, Hama and Deir Ezzor. 
Fourth, the precipitating factor is a specific event that triggers 
group action. The arrest and torture of school students in Dar’a 
by the time the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia had succeeded 
in bringing two dictators down, was the last straw for the Syri-
an people to start their action against the regime. The fifth so-
cial determinant is mobilization of participants for action. I 
would argue here that the modern mass media, most important-
ly TV channels, have been the main source of mobilisation for 
the revolution to extend and get bigger over the Syrian regions. 
Sixth, operation of social control indicates "those counter-
determinants which prevent, interrupt, deflect, or inhibit the 
accumulation of the [above] determinants".39 Tribal leaders 
played a major role at the beginning of the uprising to prevent 
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their tribesmen from participating in the protests and clashing 
with the security forces.  
 
The repression and torture exercised by Syrian security forces 
in their attempt to interrupt and prevent all the above-
mentioned determinants which pushed the revolution towards 
“collective violence”.40 The outline of his theory can be sum-
marized briefly. The primary sequence in collective violence 
starts with the “development of discontent” and then the “polit-
icisation of that discontent”, and finally its “actualization in 
violent action against political objects”.41 The armed violence, 
which came as a response to the regime’s violence corresponds 
with the concept of intiqaam, which means revenge for real or 
perceived offenses committed against one’s kin. Members of 
the Arab tribes in Syria are bound by honour to take vengeance 
upon the aggressor, which, in this case, are the Syrian security 
forces who are deemed hostile towards the members of the 
tribe. 
 
Sheikhs as “guarantors”  
Historically, it was unlikely that states could impose effective 
control over the tribes in their vast territories because the cost 
of policing and maintaining control would likely be much 
higher than what taxes could be extracted from the small num-
ber of tribesmen.42 To guarantee a continuous and safe passage 
through tribal regions for the purposes of travel and commerce, 
states would “buy” the support of the tribes by catering to their 
leaders. There are numerous historical examples of the estab-
lishment of asymmetric alliances and coalitions between strong 
states or imperial powers and prominent tribal leaders for im-
mediate strategic purposes.43 In Syria, first the Ottomans and 
later the mandate powers tried to implement a kind of “indirect 
rule” through the co-opting  of Bedouin sheikhs to whom they 
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granted extended privileges such as honourable titles and per-
mission to register extensive private landholdings in their 
name. As it was mentioned earlier, Hafez al-Assad and later 
Bashar created a system of clientelism between the regime and 
influential tribal sheikhs.  
By establishing alliances with particular tribal leaders, Hafez 
al-Assad and later his son Bashar, were able to maintain control 
of large areas of the Syrian Steppe. As much as they both relied 
on the Alawites for filling all strategic military and security po-
sitions, they also relied on certain tribes to join the military and 
state institutions. They paid acute attention to the tribal and 
sectarian backgrounds of their top ranking commanding offic-
ers. On 18 July 2012, after Defence Minister Dawoud Rajiha 
was assassinated in a bombing in Damascus, Fehd Jassem al-
Freij was appointed by Bashar al-Assad as his successor. It has 
been overlooked that al-Assad appointed a Sunni Muslim with 
a tribal background at such a crucial point in the conflict. An-
other question that comes to mind is what has made Moham-
mad Said Bkhaytan and many other officials with Sunni tribal 
backgrounds so loyal to the Syrian regime thus far? And why is 
it that army officers with renowned tribal backgrounds have not 
been defecting? 
Over the last few decades, Fehd Jassem al-Freij, Mohammad 
Said Bkhaytan and many other tribal leaders across the country 
helped to establish the regime’s legitimacy and ensure stabil-
ity.44 During the first few months of the uprising, these tribal 
leaders had managed to forge convoluted relationships between 
the state and the community in which they have influence. In 
the early months of the uprising, many tribal leaders, especially 
in al-Hasakeh and Raqqa, actively opposed the protests to pro-
tect their tribes and clans from the Regime’s retribution.45 
While many regions of Syria like Dar’a and Deir Ezzor where 
big tribes like Nu’im, Aqaydat exist have become a veritable 
war zone, other provinces where tribes of the Shammar confed-
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eracy and al-Fadl live have remained safe enough to absorb the 
hundreds of thousands of people displaced from other parts of 
the Syrian Badia. In some areas, tribesmen from the same tribe 
had different attitudes towards the protests. Some tribesmen 
from Hadidiyn tribe issued a statement disowning Fehd Jassem 
al-Freij and asking him to defect from the regime. Some other 
army officers from the same tribe announced their loyalty to 
the regime against the “conspiracy”. In an interview with Ah-
mad Fahed Hadidy, from the Hadidiyn tribe, he was asked to 
clarify these contradictions within the same tribe, he said: 
“Hafez al-Assad spent decades side-lining the traditional tribal 
sheikhs by creating a new system of chiefdom of newly ap-
pointed sheikhs who had close ties to the intelligence service. 
By doing so, he hoped to internally dismantle the power of the 
tribes by placing obstacles between the sheikhs and their peo-
ple.46 The power and the influence within the tribe shifted, says 
Bander al-Khaledi from Bani Khaled tribe who escaped to 
Saudi Arabia after the uprising. “The sheikhs that the regime 
created within each tribe are playing the regime’s game at the 
moment but these sheikhs have brought shame on themselves 
and their tribe and there will be a time when they will be 
brought to court for their crimes.”47 It seems that the policies of 
the Syrian regime in co-opting tribal leaders have succeeded in 
creating allies within certain tribes that are not interested to see 
it fall. These policies have created strife within some tribes, 
sometimes even within the same clan, as some stick with Assad 
and some oppose him.48 
 
“Gathering” the tribes 
Tribal gatherings have, on a large scale, emerged following the 
Syria uprising. During Hafez and Bashar’s reigns, the tribes did 
not have political coalitions or activities and the tribal political 
12    Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising 
 
life was confined to some members in the parliament who did 
not have much weight.  
The regime has been trying to win the hearts and minds of 
tribes by generously bribing the tribal sheikhs with money, 
cars, and land. This has been successful with a lot of sheikhs 
who are supportive of the regime, especially the tribal leaders 
in the north and east. The regime tried to mobilize certain cities 
and regions by invoking tribal identity on a moral level. The 
regime started periodically holding “tribal conferences” in 
Homs, Tartous and al-Raqqa in which sheikhs of tribes were 
asked to issue statements of loyalty and pledge of support to 
Bashar al-Assad.49 They were asked in front of the state media 
to encourage their tribesmen to refuse joining the rebels and to 
condemn western and Arabian Gulf interference in Syrian in-
ternal affairs. The loyal tribes attending these conferences have 
announced the establishment of the Syrian and Arab Tribes and 
Clans Forum. Sheikh Saleh al-Deli al-Nu'eimi, said that the fo-
rum sends a clear message, which rejects foreign interference 
and the conspiracy against Syria and voices support for nation-
al dialogue and reforms.50 Tribal Sheikhs were also asked to 
meet the Russian ambassador and present him with gifts after 
Russia’s veto against the Security Council resolution condemn-
ing the regime massacres. Moreover, they were also asked to 
meet with the UN Secretary General's envoy Kofi Annan to 
denounce the “terrorist acts” that target innocent people reject-
ing the economic siege imposed on Syria. Syrian state media 
presented these tribal sheikhs as symbols of Syrian identity and 
patriotism.  
On the other hand, the first tribal gathering against the regime 
was held in the Jordanian city, al-Mafraq in January 2012. 
More than 250 people from different tribal confederations like 
Aneza, Shammar and Baggarah attended the meeting. They 
confirmed in their meeting that the uprising was based on the 
tribes and asked the Syrian National Council for a representa-
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tion that equals their weight in the Syrian uprising.51 As for the 
rhetoric of the leaders of the Syrian National Council, while 
appearing to avoid mentioning the tribal factor, they occasion-
ally spoke of some support and loyalty offered by the Syrian 
tribes to the opposition – as a reaction to the tribal discourse 
employed by the official media.52 Syrian tribal leaders started 
holding gatherings, conferences and symposiums in different 
countries with the aim of unifying the ranks and collecting the 
legacy of the tribe. They sought to establish coalitions, most 
recently the Syrian Arab Tribes Council (SATC) which held its 
founding meeting on April 16th 2011 in Istanbul, with the 
agreement of the Syrian National Council (SNC). The emer-
gence of SATC has been legitimized by SNC. Therefore, 
SATC has been a political framework accepted internally and 
externally, and aims at activating the role of Syrian tribes at 
this stage of the uprising and post-Assad Syria. Muhammad 
Mazyad al-Tirkawi, a member of SATC and SNC, stated that 
SATC will work on the formation of local tribal councils, and 
will coordinate with the Kurdish and Druze tribes to maintain 
security after the fall of the Assad regime, and this will be su-
pervised by the SNC.53 
In a Skype interview I conducted with Muhammad Mazyad al-
Tirkawi, he argued that “the political history of the tribes in 
contemporary Syria” is affecting their role in the Syrian oppo-
sition. He referred to two divisions that emerged within the 
Syrian National Council. First, the Kurdish-Arab division that 
is related to previous policies adopted by Hafez al-Assad who 
encouraged thousands of people, mainly from Shammar and 
Al-Jabbur tribes, to settle in villages built over Kurdish fertile 
lands in order to challenge the status quo of the region, which 
have traditionally had a Kurdish majority. This big divide cre-
ated between the Arab tribes and the Kurds in al-Hasakeh was 
clearly manifested during a conference for the Syrian opposi-
tion held in Cairo in 2012 where the Kurdish parties ended up 
withdrawing after wrangling with the the Syrian Arab Tribes 
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Council (SATC) in which the latter refused a Kurdish sugges-
tion to abolish the “discriminatory” projects initiated by the 
Syrian regime on their lands.  
 
The other divide appeared between the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which is the dominant political power in the SNC, and the trib-
al council. As it has been stated already, Hafez al-Assad incor-
porated the tribes in his process of state building in Syria. He 
used the tribes as a counterweight to the Islamists. The coali-
tion between Hafez al-Assad’s regime and the tribes was a 
thorn in the side of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim 
Brotherhood continued to pour time and resources into building 
its influence within the Syrian opposition and has finally 
achieved its domination over the tribal council by appointing 
sheikh Salem Abdul-Aziz al-Mislat, who belongs to the move-
ment itself, as the head of the tribal council. 
Table of the most prominent tribes in Syria and their stance 
from the Syrian uprising 
The tribe in Syria, as in the rest of the Arab world, is divided 
into smaller parallel sections – ‘asha’ir’ (clans) and ‘afkhad’ 
(lineages). These tribes inhabit Al-Badia, which covers 55 per-











Southern Region Tribes Central Region Tribes Northern & Eastern 
Region Tribes 
Fadl Split *Aneza (a group of related 
tribes including the 
following: 
*Aneza (a group of related 
tribes including the 
following: 
al-Zoubi55 Split *Hasanah Split *Fad’an Loyal 
al-Hariri56 Opposition *Sba’ah Silent Al-Jabbur Loyal 
al-Masalmeh 
 
Opposition Turki Opposition al-
Mashahdeh 
Silent 
Nu’im Opposition Bani 
Khaled 
Split Busha’ban Split 
  Fawa’ira Opposition Tay Loyal 
  Aqaydat Split *Shammar (a group of related 
tribes including the 
following): 
  Hadidiyn Loyal *Al-Khursah Opposition 
  Mawali Silent Al-Aslam *Opposition 
  Nu’im Opposition   
  Bushakim Silent   
Notes:  
Some tribes inhabit more than one region 
 Four classifications distinguish the stance of the tribe 
towards the regime during the Syrian uprising: 
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 Loyal (standing with the regime) 2- Opposition (stand-
ing against the regime) 3- Split (there is no agreement 
within the tribe on who to support) 4- Silent (did not 
take any position and decided to be neutral). 
 
“Tribal Crescent” versus “Shiite Crescent”  
A majority of the largest Syrian tribal groups are branches of 
sub-tribes of a confederated system (qabila) that originated in 
the Arabian Peninsula and subsequently migrated north to gain 
access to water and grazing land. Among the most prominent 
of these groups are the Aneza and Shammar confederation of 
tribes from Nejd who began moving north in the 18th and the 
19th century to conquer the Badia of Greater Syria.57 By the 
middle of the 19th century, both Aneza and Shammar tribes had 
established themselves firmly in the Badia and controlled the 
important routes of trade and pilgrimage caravans between 
Damascus and Baghdad and Damascus and Mecca.58  
To understand the nature of these deep tribal bonds that span 
Syria, we need to understand some of the assumptions of clas-
sical social anthropology. The Arab tribal formation, that exists 
today, functions in an analogous manner with a power-
balancing conception of international relations.59 According to 
this view, tribes are organized in a horizontal pattern based on 
patrilineal lines of descent from a common ancestor.60 Individ-
ual segments engage in a continual process of fission and fu-
sion in response to external conflicts, forming short-lived, 
complementary opposing power blocs that prevent the rise of a 
single hegemonic leadership.61 Therefore, we can notice that 
the Arab tribal systems are akin to mini-states whose transna-
tional bonds can be tapped into to forge channels of communi-
cation and access to foreign powers in the region, especially in 
the Gulf.  
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The relationship between certain tribes in Syria and other Gulf 
countries seems to be very much of the patron and client. The 
Saudis have always provided Aneza with political backing and 
financial subsidies. During King Abdullah’s visit to Syria in 
2010, he handed over large cheques to each of the Aneza 
sheikhs.62 In return, the Saudis seem to expect loyalty and some 
indirect pathways into Syrian politics. Moreover, the rulers of 
other Gulf countries supported different tribes. For example, 
the annual Palmyra camel race served as a cover for Qatari 
support to the Hadidiyn tribe and other tribes.63 The Syrian re-
gime benefited from these inter-tribal relations in different 
ways. First, since members of tribes like Hasanah and Turki 
from Aneza confederation were able to cross borders freely and 
legitimately, they were exploited by prominent figures in the 
Syrian regime to smuggle arms and drugs and therefore create a 
black market that was lucrative for both sides. Second, these 
bonds provided a way for the Syrian regime to get rid of a large 
number of unemployed people from the Badia region who have 
immigrated to the Gulf for economic reasons.  
The shared cross-border kinship ties possessed by Syrian tribes 
and networks of tribal youth in Arab Gulf countries presented a 
regional geopolitical complication to the uprising.64 As soon as 
the uprising started in Syria and after the bloody crackdown 
against the peaceful protestors, the tribes of Homs and Deir Ez-
zor contacted their “cousins” in the Gulf asking for a firm dip-
lomatic and economic position regarding Damascus. When the 
Arab tribes in Syria made appeals for protection from the bru-
tality of the Al-Assad regime, their tribal kinsmen in the Gulf 
States of Saudi Arabia and Qatar have had a hard time ignoring 
them.65 Saudi Arabia and Qatar are reported to be using tribal 
networks to move materiel and weapons into Syria. The ances-
tral connections have ignited sympathies among thousands of 
Saudis, Kuwaitis and Qataris who have donated millions of 
dollars in aid and recently military equipment to the free Syrian 
army.66 
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Much has been said about the Gulf’s interest in regime change 
in Syria to steer Damascus away from Tehran and bolster their 
regional standing.67 Saudi Arabia is troubled by the "Shiite 
Crescent" that has extended from Iran through Iraq, into Syria 
and to the Mediterranean shores of Lebanon.68 The uprising in 
Syria created an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to use tribal 
bonds to destroy the regime of Syrian strongman Bashar Al-
Assad. Ahmad Jarba, the current president of the opposition 
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition 
Forces, is an influential tribal figure who has close links to 
Saudi Arabia. It is widely believed that Saudi Arabia has sup-
ported him to gain this position after he played a vital role in 
bridging the gap between tribes in eastern Syria and the opposi-
tion. 
The Saudi-Qatari competition for influence over the Syrian op-
position has tribal repercussions as well. As stated previously, 
Saudi Arabia has sought to consolidate the position of Ahmad 
al-Jarba based on tribal connections, to become the president of 
the National Coalition in July 2013. Riad Hijab, who stood as 
the rival candidate for what is seen as the Qatari-backed fac-
tion69 belongs to al-Sukhne tribe that is based in Deir-Ezzor 
Governorate. The election of Ahmed Jarba, to be head of the 
major opposition umbrella organization was a Saudi Arabian 
victory over Qatar and its candidate.  Jarba, is from the para-
mount sheikhly lineage of the northern [Sunni] Shammar and a 
close cousin of Ghazi al Yawar, the interim president of Iraq 
following the liberation in 2003. 
 
Tribal ties put pressure on Iraq 
Tribal ties extend beyond the Syrian Iraqi borders and making 
them united. Among the most prominent of these groups with 
tribal ties are Aneza, Shammar, Aqaydat and Al-Jabbur. The 
first problem that the Iraqi government faced with the upsurge 
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of the Syrian uprising was the large influx of refugees. Most of 
the refugees crossing over have relatives in Iraq, and intended 
to head straight to them until the situation back home im-
proved.70 Instead, they were crammed together in local schools 
and government buildings, and the army and police imposed 
strict restrictions on their movement. Thousands of Iraqis 
marched through al-Qaim city to denounce their government's 
policy in preventing their relatives from Syria to stay with 
them.71 In a Skype interview I conducted with someone from 
al-Jabbur tribe, he commented on this situation “The tribes in 
Iraq and Syria are the same but the political borders have di-
vided us. Each family in Syria has uncles, aunts and cousins in 
Iraq". After the protests of the Iraqi tribes, the government has 
reached a compromise with them to allow the Syrian refugees 
to leave the schools provided they had relatives who could 
"sponsor" them, and if they could deliver written guarantees to 
the government.  
Sheikh Abdul Rahman Ali, chief of the tribal council in Falluja 
says “when Assad goes, we will have a brother regime at our 
back.”72 As the fighting between forces loyal to President Ba-
shar al-Assad and the armed opposition has spilled across the 
Iraqi borders, Iraqi tribes have decisively joined their fellow 
Syrians in the battles that took place there. More than 40 Syrian 
soldiers who had sought temporary safety in Iraq from rebel 
fighters along the border were killed in an attack by the Iraqi 
tribes.73 The Syrian uprising is stirring Iraqi tribal sympathies 
and is increasingly threatening to renew the conflict in a coun-
try that is still suffering from instability after the American in-
vasion.74  
 
Tribes and the armed conflict: 
Now with a brutal civil war raging all over Syria, the Syrian 
regime has crumbled and as a result society in the desert has 
fallen back on the tribes.75 Tribal militias composed of many 
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Syrian army defectors were formed in different parts of the 
Syrian Steppe which constitutes 55% of Syrian land. Their mo-
bility combined with their loyalty to their kin groups and their 
military capacity due to the arms received during Hafez and 
Bashar’s rule make them strong enough to take control of large 
areas within the Syrian Steppe. 
 
In a remarkable shift from the tense relationship that lasted for 
decades between the tribes and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syr-
ia, a recent video released by the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIS), showed what it called swearing an oath of alle-
giance to the ISIS by more than a dozen tribes in the province 
of Raqqa east of Syria.76 The development comes several 
weeks after ISIS received formal pledges of loyalty from a 
number of tribal representatives in rural Aleppo.77 Different 
reports confirm the shift towards an alliance between certain 
tribes.78 and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant in joining bat-
tles against the regime and the Kurds. Not all tribes fight 
against the regime, however. Some tribal leaders who have 
close links to the security services in Syria have remained loyal 
to the regime.79 In al-Hassakeh governorate, the People’s Pro-
tection Units (YPG), the armed wing of the Democratic Union 
Party (PYD), a Syrian Kurdish political group has been en-
gaged in armed conflict with jihadist groups such as the Nusra 
Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. As the 
fighting has moved into Arab-majority territories between fac-
tions, certain clans of Shammar and the Sharabia tribes have 
joined the Kurds in their battles against the Islamists.80 Both of 
the Kurds and the Islamists have increasingly relied on support 
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Conclusion 
The Syrian regimes of Hafez al-Assad and later his son Bashar 
utilised the tribes in the build-up of their authoritarian power 
and used them as tools to fight the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Kurdish attempts to gain autonomy. This era witnessed a bal-
anced relationship between the tribes and the Syrian regime 
through which we could see an alliance between both of them 
that is based on interests owing to the dynamic and pragmatic 
nature of the tribes’ quest for survival and prosperity. Tribal 
representation in the Syrian Parliament increased; tribal leaders 
started to appear in prominent positions in the state institutions 
(army, security apparatus and the Ba’ath Party branches). 
However, the collapse of the rural economy of tribal communi-
ties in the south and east of Syria during Bashar al-Assad’s re-
gime due to drought, lack of development projects and the 
mismanagement of al-Badia resources ignited the Syrian upris-
ing to start in tribal regions.  
Therefore, incorporation of the tribes by the authoritarian re-
gime in Syria was decisive for regime consolidation in order to 
get support from the tribes and expand their patronage net-
works in society while alienation and exclusion of the tribes led 
at a later stage to de-stabilization of the regime. From Dar’a 
south of Syria all the way northeast to al-Hassakeh, tribal links 
have had a strong influence on shaping the nature of the Syrian 
uprising. In response to the regime’s use of force against the 
protest movement, tribes resorted to armed self-defense against 
the security forces. The tribes have been largely, but not exclu-
sively supportive of the opposition. Some tribal leaders who 
have close links to the security services established tribal mili-
tias that have been fighting with the regime against the opposi-
tion. Moreover, the Syrian uprising has proved that regional 
tribal bonds are still strong and resilient which is shown in the 
Arabian Gulf and Iraqi tribal support to their fellow tribesmen 
in Syria. Whether the Syrian regime falls or keeps power, tribes 
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will play a vital role in any attempt to reconcile social and po-
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